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CASE COMMENTS
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba-The
United States Supreme Court in effect declined to place new
limitations upon the act of state doctrine which would have al-
lowed review of cases arising out of the purely commercial opera-
tions of a foreign State.
INTRODUCTION
An area of controversy that has sharply divided the United
States Supreme Court in recent years is whether the act of state
doctrine' should be applied to render certain actions of a foreign
State non-reviewable on the merits in United States courts. The
classic American statement of the doctrine was expressed in
Underhill v. Hernandez.2 Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for a
unanimous Court, set forth the rationale for the exercise of judi-
cial restraint:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.3
Although this statement appears simple, each phrase requires
careful interpretation. The task of deciding what constitutes
"acts of the government of another" or what is meant by "within
its own territory" in a particular case is not an easy one.
In addition, the application of the act of state doctrine pre-
sents more difficulties than mere rule interpretation. Any deci-
sion by a United States court affecting the liabilities of a foreign
sovereign involves foreign policy considerations. While the Judi-
ciary may feel obligated to provide a forum in which a private
party may seek redress, it may at the same time feel constrained
to defer to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.4 The
1. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. XIV, § 1 (1971); 1 J.H.W.
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 309-15 (1968); Henkin, Act of State
Today: Recollections in Tranquillity, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967).
2. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
3. Id. at 252.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
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result has been an inconclusive shifting of power among the
three branches of government. It is not surprising that cases in-
volving the act of state doctrine have resulted in deep divisions
in the Court which have prevented its movement in a predictable
direction.
The Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba5 [hereinafter referred to as Dunhill] recently
examined the act of state doctrine in the context of a Cuban
expropriation of property. The Court endeavored to define a
broad new area-commercial transactions-in which that doc-
trine would never be applied. However, the holding that finally
secured a majority vote failed to clarify the controversy surround-
ing the application of the act of state doctrine since the Court
decided the case in a manner which avoided direct confrontation
with that issue.6
I. FACTS
On September 15, 1960, the revolutionary government of
Fidel Castro moved to nationalize ("intervene") five Cuban busi-
ness entities which were the leading manufacturers and exporters
of Havana cigars.7 These businesses were owned almost entirely
by Cuban nationals.'
The Cuban Government appointed "interventors"I for each
of the companies. These interventors, acting on behalf of the
Government, expropriated all assets, properties, and production
capabilities of the companies and continued to manufacture and
export cigars under the same brand names and trademarks.'" One
of the importers in the United States to whom the interventors
continued to ship cigars was Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.,"
appellant in this case.
The former owners of the intervened companies, most of
5. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
6. The Supreme Court had asked that counsel for each side address himself to the
question: "Should this Court's holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino be recon-
sidered?" 424 U.S. 1005 (1975). For different reasons each answered in the negative, and
the Court never referred to the question again.
7. 425 U.S. at 685.
8. Id.
9. Interventors is the name given to agents appointed to take over and manage
business entities which have been intervened or nationalized. Id.
10. Id.




whom had fled to the United States, commenced actions in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against several United States importers, including Dunhill,
to recover the purchase price of cigars shipped to the importers
both before and after the expropriation. 12 The interventors and
the Republic of Cuba were made additional parties plaintiff. ' :'
The actions-owners against importers and interventors against
importers-were consolidated in Menendez v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg. ' 4
The district court in Menendez, under the act of state doc-
trine, acknowledged the right of the Cuban nationals and of the
interventors to receive all monies for shipments made subsequent
to the intervention.'5 However, it held that payments made by the
importers to the interventors for cigars shipped prior to the inter-
vention were actually owed to the owners,'" and that the payment
to the interventors did not discharge the debt.' 7 The court consid-
ered the situs of the debts to be in the United States with the
debtors. The debts therefore were not subject to the original ex-
propriation.'8 The court allowed the importers to offset the pay-
ments already made to the interventors for pre-intervention ship-
ments against monies owed the interventors for post-intervention
shipments.'9 Dunhill, the only importer whose pre-intervention
payments exceeded the amount owed for post-intervention ship-
ments, was awarded affirmative judgment against the interven-
tors for the difference. 20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the right of all the importers to offset, 2' but viewed the
12. The former owners also sued for trademark infringement. Judge Ryan found that
there had been an infringement of trademark rights, which is a violation of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970), but that no damages could be proven.
The injunctive relief asked for became unnecessary when the United States embargo
against Cuban goods became effective on February 7, 1962. Menendez v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg, 345 F. Supp. 527, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Menendez v. Saks,
485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
13. 345 F. Supp. at 533.
14. Id. at 527.
15. Id. at 534.
16. Id. at 542.
17. Id. at 540.
18. Id. at 538.
19. Id. at 543.
20. Id. at 564 (supplemental memorandum).
21. Menendez v. Saks, 485 F.2d 1355, 1374 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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affirmative judgment awarded Dunhill as violative of the act of
state doctrine since any obligation of Cuba to repay Dunhill was
quasi-contractual and now had its situs in Cuba." Dunhill's peti-
tion for review by the Supreme Court was granted."
II. RECENT BACKGROUND: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
A. The Sabbatino Case
The recent controversy over the act of state doctrine of which
Dunhill forms yet another chapter began with the 1964 Supreme
Court decision, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino24 [here-
inafter referred to as Sabbatino]. In that case, the Cuban Gov-
ernment had expropriated the property of a Cuban sugar cor-
poration, owned primarily by Americans, in retaliation for a re-
duction by the United States in the Cuban sugar import quota.
An American commodity broker who had contracted for a ship-
load of sugar prior to the expropriation entered into a new con-
tract with the Cuban Government in order to obtain release of the
sugar from Havana Harbor. After release, the broker made pay-
ment to the former owners of the sugar, and the Cuban Govern-
ment, through Banco Nacional de Cuba, brought suit. The Su-
preme Court, with Justice White the lone dissenter, held for the
Cubans..2 1
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, presented a modern
refinement of the act of state doctrine:
The Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign gov-
ernment, extant and recognized[6] by this country at the time
of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agree-
ment regarding controlling legal principles even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law.2"
Although the Court tried to avoid creating an "inflexible and all-
encompassing rule, '"2 it made sweeping pronouncements. It de-
22. Id. at 1370.
23. 416 U.S. 981 (1974).
24. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
25. Id.
26. The words "extant and recognized" distinguished this case from Bernstein v. N.
V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappi, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
The court in Bernstein held that act of state need not be applied to the Nazi Government
which was no longer extant. 210 F.2d at 376.




clined, for example, to examine the expropriation against the
background of principles of international law because such prin-
ciples could not be agreed upon by all or even most of the nations
of the world. 2 The district court in Sabbatino" had ruled that the
expropriation was invalid since the law authorizing the taking
was blatantly discriminatory and was directed specifically
against United States citizens3' to whom no adequate compensa-
tion was given. 32 However, the Supreme Court declined to leap
into this "battleground for conflicting ideologies. '3 3 It reiterated
its intention not to encroach upon sovereign prerogatives by ques-
tioning the validity of a taking by a foreign government within
its own territory, and implied that only the executive branch had
such power.34
The Court noted that the act of state doctrine has "constitu-
tional underpinnings . . . [and] arises out of the basic relation-
ships between branches of government in a system of separation
of powers." 35 Since foreign policy falls within the purview of the
executive branch,36 the Court decided to refrain from reviewing
the expropriatory acts of a sovereign State where it might embar-
rass the President in his conduct of foreign affairs. As a practical
matter, the Court suggested that diplomacy offered a better way
"to assure that United States citizens who are harmed are com-
pensated fairly. '3
29. There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a State's power to expropriate the
property of aliens. . . . The disagreement as to relevant international law stan-
dards reflects an even more basic divergence between the national interests of
capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social ideolo-
gies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable portion of the
means of production and those that adhere to a free enterprise system.
Id. at 428-30.
30. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
31. The Cuban law stated, "[The President and Prime Minister] may proceed to
nationalize, through forced expropriations, the properties or enterprises owned by physical
and corporate persons who are nationals of the United States of North America ... "
376 U.S. at 401-02 n.3.
32. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated in 1940 that it was the policy of the United
States to recognize the right of a country to expropriate for public purposes conditioned
on the requirement of "adequate, effective, and prompt compensation." Note from Sec-
retary of State Hull to Mexican Ambassador, Apr. 3, 1940, MS. Dep't of State, File No.
812.6363/6659A, noted in 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 662 (1942).
33. 376 U.S. at 430 n.34.
34. Id. at 428.
35. 425 U.S. at 726, quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
36. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
37. 376 U.S. at 429. The Court pointed out its own limitations in these matters,
stating that "[jiudicial determinations of invalidity of title can, on the other hand, have
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B. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment
In 1962, Congress had passed the first Hickenlooper Amend-
ment38 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 31 The Amendment
prevented the President from sending foreign aid to a country
which had nationalized property owned by any United States
citizen. 0 In the wake of Sabbatino,4' Congress was urged by inter-
national businessmen and lawyers to take further action. The
result was an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,12
often called the Sabbatino Amendment or the second Hicken-
looper Amendment.43
This amendment provided that no court should invoke the
act of state doctrine to avoid making a determination on the
merits of a case involving foreign confiscations of property belong-
ing to United States citizens.4 According to Senator Hicken-
only an occasional impact, since they depend on the fortuitous circumstances of the
property in question being brought into this country." Id.
38. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-565, § 301(d)(3), 76 Stat. 260, as
amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(A) (1970).
39. Pub. L. No. 87-194, 75 Stat. 424.
40. This first Hickenlooper Amendment states:
(e) (1) The President shall suspend assistance to the government of any coun-
try to which assistance is provided under this Act when the government of such
country or any other governmental agency or subdivision within such country
on or after January 1, 1962-
(A) has nationalized or expropriated or seized ownership or control of property
owned by any United States citizen or by any corporation . . . not less than 50
per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens ....
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-565, § 301(d)(3), 76 Stat. 260, as amended,
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(A) (1970).
41. Response to the Sabbatino decision was varied and intense. See, e.g., Henkin,
The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1962).
In applauding the decision, Professor Henkin said, "Sabbatino is evidence that the United
States, now a most powerful nation with interests reaching everywhere, may be prepared
to accord similar respect to new nations." Id. at 830.
Others found the Sabbatino decision dangerous. E.g., Stevenson, The State Depart-
ment & Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors Are By Victories Undone," 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707
(1964). See also Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Abstention, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972); Metzger, The State Department's Role in the Judicial Adminis-
tration of the Act of State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1972); Domke, Friedmann, &
Henkin, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 99 (1965); Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964); Collinson,
Sabbatino: The Treatment of International Law in United States Courts, 3 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 27 (1964).
42. Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009.
43. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1013, as
amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
44. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
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looper, Congress intended to discourage foreign governments
from nationalizing property of United States citizens in a manner
contrary to international law,45 and to prevent the law of the
offending country from operating as a shield when the courts of
the United States are called upon to consider the consequences
of an unlawful nationalization."
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or taking after January 1, 1959, by an
act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the
principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection:
Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in
which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect
to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable
letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to
the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interest of the United
States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the
court.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
45. The language of the Hickenlooper Amendment is tied to a presumption of cus-
tomary international law, the validity of which is in doubt, as evidenced by the Sabbatino
decision. The United States position that any expropriation was valid only if it were for a
public purpose and was accompanied by "adequate, effective, and prompt compensa-
tion," see note 32 supra, was supported at one time by a majority of those nations taking
a position. But by 1975, all but a few members of the United Nations declared a "new
emerging standard of compensation" in the Declaration on Establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3281, ch. I, art. 2, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974). It stated:
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty,
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and
economic activities.
...In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a contro-
versy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and
by its tribunals. ...
Id. (emphasis added).
In an early article on this subject, Professor Friedmann stated:
The view taken by Mexico, that in case of nationalization foreign interests
should not be entitled to better treatment than national interests, undoubtedly
represents the dominant philosophy of capital importing countries.
Friedmann, The Position of Underdeveloped Countries and the Universality of Interna-
tional Law, 2 INT'L L. BULL. 5, 6-7 (1963).
46. 110 CONG. REc. 19,559 (1964) (remarks of Senator Hickenlooper). The Senator
stated that
[the Amendment] will serve notice that foreign states taking action against
U.S. investments in violation of international law cannot market the product
of their expropriation in the United States free from the risk of litigation.
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After the bill became law, Sabbatino was reinstituted in
the district court as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.7 Ruling
that the second Hickenlooper Amendment was applicable, the
court awarded payment for the sugar to the former owners rather
than to the interventors. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed,48 and certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court.49
It is interesting to note that even the strong language of the
second Hickenlooper Amendment stops short of establishing a
definite rule as to which branch of government should handle act
of state questions. The statute stipulates that it need not be
applied in any case where the President believes foreign policy
considerations dictate otherwise.59
C. The Bernstein Exception
Prior to the direct attack by the second Hickenlooper
Amendment upon the act of state doctrine, the doctrine was sub-
ject to suspension in special circumstances under the "Bernstein
exception," derived from the case Bernstein v. N. V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maarschappij. " In
1948 and 1949, Bernstein, a former German national, brought two
actions in United States courts52 to recover property confiscated
in Germany under the so-called anti-Jewish decrees of the Nazi
Government. This case clearly met the criteria of an act of state,
i.e., action of a sovereign State against one of its own nationals
within its own territory. Therefore no examination was made of
the legality of the seizure.
In 1954, in a petition to amend this decision, counsel for
plaintiff Bernstein submitted with his brief a letter from the De-
partment of State. The letter declared the State Department's
intention to "relieve American courts from any restraint upon the
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts
of Nazi officials."54 In other words, the Executive declared that
47. 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968).
48. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
49. 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
50. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). See note 44 supra.
51. 76 F. Supp. 335, aff'd, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), as amended, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954). This was the so-called second Bernstein case. The first case, in which plaintiff
Bernstein was denied relief, was Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Soci6t6 Anonyme, 163
F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
52. See id.
53. 163 F.2d at 248-49.
54. 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592 (1949).
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no foreign policy considerations precluded the court from making
a determination on the merits in this case. The court, with this
directive from the Executive, examined the case on its merits and
awarded judgment for Bernstein.5 Since that time, any letter
from the executive branch stating that foreign policy considera-
tions need not hinder the Judiciary from reviewing on the merits
a case which would ordinarily fall within the scope of the act of
state doctrine has been called a "Bernstein letter," and the ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine created thereby has been
called a "Bernstein exception."
D. The Citibank Case
After Sabbatino the act of state doctrine was next examined
by the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba" [hereinafter referred to as Citibank]. Citi-
bank had made secured loans to Cuba. A portion of the loans had
been paid off, and a part of the collateral returned. When the
Cuban Government expropriated property owned by United
States nationals, it confiscated Citibank's branches in Cuba. In
retaliation Citibank sold the collateral. All but approximately
$1.8 million of this sum was used to discharge the outstanding
debt, and this balance was retained by Citibank as partial pay-
ment for its expropriated and uncompensated properties. Cuba
sued for return of the $1.8 million and Citibank counterclaimed
for its expropriation loss.5 7
Before this case was decided hopes were high that a clear
decision would be made regarding a formula for the balancing of
power between the Executive and Judiciary in act of state cases. "
Instead, the Court secured a majority vote on only two points.
The first was that a State, having invoked the jurisdiction of a
court, cannot escape the judgment of that court.59 The second was
that a private party's counterclaim will be allowed against a
55. 210 F.2d at 376.
56. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
57. Id. at 760-61.
58. See Leigh, The Supreme Court and the Sabbatino Watchers: First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (1972). The author wrote the
"Bernstein letter" submitted by the Department of State in the Dunhill action.
59. Justice Douglas, in putting forth this line of reasoning in his concurrence, relied
solely on First National City Bank v. Republic of China, 384 U.S. 356 (1955), in which
the Court had ruled that once the Republic of China had brought suit in courts of the
United States, it was liable for any counterclaim which would normally have been barred
by considerations of sovereign immunity. 406 U.S. at 771.
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State up to the point of setoff on any claim arising from a rela-
tionship between the parties which existed at the time of the act
of state.6"
The third point stated by Justice Rehnquist was unable to
command a majority of the Court. He believed that instructions
from the Executive in the form of a "Bernstein letter" limiting
the application of the act of state doctrine should be dispositive.
The act of state doctrine is grounded on judicial concern that
application of customary principles of law to judge the acts of a
foreign sovereign might frustrate the conduct of foreign relations
by the political branches of the government. We conclude that
where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly repre-
sents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing, we of
course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to
the act of state doctrine."
Six justices, however, refused to subscribe to the "Bern-
stein exception."' 2 Justices Douglas and Powell, although voting
with the majority, were explicit in their rejection of the unwar-
ranted shifting of power from the judicial to the executive
branch.13 Justice Douglas wrote that if the Court applies the
"Bernstein exception," "[it] becomes a mere errand boy for the
Executive which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts
from the fire, but not others.' '64 According to Justice Powell,
I would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require
the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invok-
ing its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine
of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict with that very
doctrine. 5
Thus, Citibank fell short of extending the restrictions on use of
the act of state doctrine to the point favored by Justice Rehn-
quist, and offered little guidance for future decisions."
60. Id. at 769.
61. Id. at 767-68.
62. Consequently, the future utility of that doctrinal basis for resolving cases remains
unclear. See Leigh, supra note 58, at 42.
63. 406 U.S. at 770-77.
64. Id. at 773.
65. Id.
66. See 3 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 117 (1973); 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1973).
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Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
Dunhill must be analyzed in light of the preceding develop-
ment of the act of state doctrine. Justice White, writing for him-
self, the Chief Justice, and Justices Rehnquist and Powell,
seemed intent upon placing yet another limitation upon the act
of state doctrine. The dissenting justices-Marshall, Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stewart-viewed this assault upon the act of
state doctrine as an ill-advised intrusion upon the discretionary
power of the Court. Only two points of the Court's decision were
approved by a majority as Justice Stevens concurred in the first
two arguments but not in the third.
Justice White's first proposition was that since the situs of a
debt is with the debtor,67 the situs of the pre-intervention ac-
counts receivable of the expropriated companies is the United
States." To allow Cuba to have these monies would, in effect, give
extraterritorial force to an act of state."
His second holding was that Cuba's refusal to return the
funds paid them, absent some formal repudiation of foreign
debts, did not constitute an act of state.7 1 Usually some formal
declaration or decree heralds an act of state." In this case the
formal decree of expropriation made September 15, 1960 confis-
cated only those properties then in Cuba. Justice White argued
that pre-intervention debts, their situs in the United States, es-
caped this formal decree of expropriation, and that only some
subsequent formal repudiation of all legitimate debts by the
Cuban Government could make confiscation of these pre-
intervention accounts fall within an act of state. Mere in-court
statements by counsel for the Republic of Cuba were not deemed
sufficient. 2
67. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
68. 96 S. Ct. at 1857. After the Dunhill decision, the Second Circuit, relying upon
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), arrived at a
similar conclusion as to the situs of debts in United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542
F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), in which the Second Circuit declined to do just that.
This case involved the attempted confiscation of the bank account of the deceased King
Faisal II which was located in a New York bank. Judge Friendly declined to allow extra-
territorial enforcement under the act of state doctrine. Id.
70. 425 U.S. at 695.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1858. See also Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 114
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) (ambassador's in-court statements held insufficient to declare an
act of state).
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It is in the third part of his opinion that Justice White endea-
vored to break new ground-to define an area in which the act of
state doctrine would never be applied. This was in the area of
commercial obligations.73 Justice White reasoned that when a
State enters into commerce with corporations or individuals of
other States, it takes on the "character of a trader" and becomes
engaged in purely private and commercial activities which should
not be given the same deference as a State's public or governmen-
tal activities. Therefore, if any suit arises from these commercial
activities, a defense of act of state should not automatically be
interposed. Justice White cited for support Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Bank of United States v. Planters Bank of
Georgia:74
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government be-
comes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself so far
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen.7
Additional support for this new "commercial exception" was
stated in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General and
in a "Bernstein letter" from the Legal Advisor to the Department
of State. 7 The letter stated: "We do not believe that the Dunhill
case raises an act of state question because the case involves an
act which is commercial, and not public, in nature. '71
Justice White reiterated the idea stated in Sabbatino and
Citibank that a major reason for invoking the act of state doctrine
is to avoid adjudication that "might embarrass the Executive
Branch of our government in the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions."78 But with respect to holding States to their commercial
obligations, certain considerations other than foreign policy be-
come even more important.
[W]e fear that embarrassment and conflict would more likely
ensue if we were to require that the repudiation of a foreign
government's debts arising from its operation of a purely com-
mercial business be recognized as an act of state and immunized
from question in our courts.79
73. 425 U.S. at 695.
74. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
75. Id. at 907.
76. 425 U.S. at 706-11 (app. 1).
77. Id. at 707.
78. Id. at 697.
79. Id. at 698.
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Justice White determined that the United States has
adopted a "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity.-," Along
with a growing number of foreign States,"' the United States has
declined to extend sovereign immunity to the commercial trans-
actions of foreign governments. 2 Of course, as Justice White
pointed out, sovereign immunity was not pleaded in this case;
however, by analogy, he reasoned that the thinking that led to the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity leads to the commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine in this case.8"
The expansion of the restrictive theory of sovereign immun-
ity is necessitated, according to Justice White, by the fact that
State participation in international trade is increasing by quan-
tum leaps. If "participants in the international market" are not
held obedient to some sort of commercial law, there is great dan-
ger of injury to private businesses and, indeed, to the whole
growth of trade among nations. The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity should apply, and nations be held to the discernible
rules of international law.84
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, would greatly
expand the restrictions upon application of the act of state doc-
trine. Rather than carving out an area of "commercial
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 69 (1965). See generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. XV, §§ 20-
26 (1971).
81. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia have adopted the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. 425 U.S. at 702 n.15.
82. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State,
to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984
(1952).
According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign
cannot, without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public
acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).
Id.
83. 425 U.S. at 705.
84. Id. at 703. Interested professors of international law, in an amici curiae brief,
stated:
[W]here an Act of State of a foreign government raises a question as to a
violation of international law, conventional or customary, courts of the United
States should determine the case on its merits, applying international law in
absence of express representation by the Executive that such determination in
that case would be harmful to the foreign policy interests of the United States.
Motion of John G. Laylin, et al., for Leave to File a Brief Amici Curiae, and Proposed
Brief at 4, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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exception," Justice Powell insisted that the Judiciary in any case
should "decide for itself whether deference to the political
branches of government requires abstention.
' '1
5
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Blackmun, dissented. First, Justice Marshall stated that al-
though the situs of accounts receivable at the time of expropria-
tion was New York as the majority had ruled, once Dunhill had
made the payments to Cuba, mistakenly or not, " they were in
Cuba's possession. Therefore the situs of the property in issue was
Cuba, and the act of state doctrine was applicable, preventing
their recovery."
Second, Justice Marshall argued that an act of state need not
be formal or affirmative,8" but may be passive as in French v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba,"5 where the mere refusal to redeem a
tax exemption certificate was ruled an act of state." Refusal by
Cuba to return the monies and its claim of such monies pursuant
to an ongoing act of expropriation required no formal declaration.
While it is true that an act of state generally takes the form of
an executive or legislative step formalized in a decree or mea-
85. 425 U.S. at 715. Justice Stevens, concurring in the decision, declined without
explanation to accept the rationale of the commercial exception. Id.
86. Jac Wolff, attorney for respondent, took issue with the description of payments
as "mistaken." He stated:
After Intervention, seemingly actuated by a motive to promote a profitable
future business relation with the Castro government, these Importers elected to
pay the price of such pre-intervention shipment to the interventors without the
consent or knowledge or authority of the owners. The courts below ruled that
such payment to the interventors did not discharge the Importer's obligation to
the owners for pre-intervention cigar shipments and granted judgment in favor
of the owners against the interventors with interest.
Respondent-Owners Brief in Opposition to Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5,
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
87. See also Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965);
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
88. 425 U.S. at 719.
89. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968). In this case, assignor of
plaintiff had invested heavily in farm land in Cuba. He had been granted tax exempt
certificates by the pre-Castro Government. These certificates entitled him to exchange
pesos earned on his farm for United States dollars and then to export those dollars (up to
a $150,000 limit) free from the Cuban export tax. However, the Cuban authorities refused
to honor the certificates. The New York Court of Appeals deemed this refusal by the
Castro Government to be an act of state and denied recovery. Id.
90. See also Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (both involved seizures by government agents in civil
war); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (refusal by revolutionary forces to issue
passport).
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sure, that is only because duly constituted governments gener-
ally act through formal means. When they do not, their acts are
no less the acts of a State, and the doctrine, being a practical
one, is no less applicable.'
The dissent saved its strongest criticism for the suggested
rationale for a broad commercial act exception to the act of state
doctrine. Justice Marshall reasoned first that the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity upon which Justice White relied
had not been accepted by the Court.9 2 Even if it had been, the
exception to sovereign immunity "ought not be transferred auto-
matically . . . to the act of state doctrine."93 According to the
dissent, although the act of state doctrine and the sovereign im-
munity doctrine share a respect for the prerogatives of sovereign
States, the former rests upon constitutional underpinnings94 and
is characterized by a flexibility which allows the Court to avoid
"political questions. 9 15 Justice Marshall stated that this flexibil-
ity should not be abandoned by the adoption of broad exceptions;
rather, it should be nurtured in the careful case-by-case approach
the Court has in the past adopted.96
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECISION
With a majority combining three divergent opinions and a
minority joining in vigorous dissent, Dunhill presented an any-
thing but clear indication of the future direction of the Court.
Clearly, the Court retreated somewhat from the idea suggested in
Citibank that whether to apply the act of state doctrine should
be decided completely at the discretion of the State Department.
91. 425 U.S. at 718-19 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 725.
93. Id. at 728.
94. Id. at 726.
95. Id. at 727. Counsel for the Republic of Cuba pointed out in its brief that it was
overly simplistic to view commercial activities as divorced from political actions.
We live in a complex world where food and oil may sometimes be as potent a
weapon as tanks and guns. We have seen in the past few years many instances
in which great political issues were raised not by marching armies but by trans-
actions which to a casual observer might appear commercial. The withholding
of oil by Middle Eastern oil producers, the sale of wheat by the United States
to the Soviet Union, the attempted world-wide embargo of Chilean Copper-all
of these are illustrative of commercial transactions with very profound political
implications.
Brief for Respondent in Reply to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
96. 425 U.S. at 728.
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Although the brief filed by the Solicitor General was referred to
by Justice White,97 and a "Bernstein letter" from the Department
of State was attached to the opinion,98 they were considered only
in conjunction with a number of other factors, and nowhere was
it suggested that they were dispositive.
Justice Marshall in his dissent took note of this withdrawal
from total reliance on instruction from the State Department. He
seemed to infer or perhaps simply hope that all the Justices were
now agreed that the "task of defining the role of the Judiciary is
for this Court, not for the Executive Branch.""
In striving to secure a majority on the "commercial act ex-
ception" Justice White used as a primary argument the effect on
world trade of allowing "trading" governments to use an act of
state defense. He stated:
The potential injury to private businessmen-and ultimately to
international trade itself---:.from a system in which some of the
participants in the international market are not subject to the
rule of law has therefore increased correspondingly.' 0
The concern over world trade and the interest of nations who
participate in world trade to develop some new sort of "law mer-
chant" to govern commercial dealings has been impelled at least
in the United States by the shock of non-compensated expropria-
tions. Indeed, the recent act of state cases have arisen from expro-
priation of properties located in Cuba since Castro came to power.
Congressional distress at such wholesale confiscation is evidenced
by the strong language of the Hickenlooper amendments and tes-
timony given at hearings before the House and Senate foreign
relations committees prior to their passage.''
A similar concern was evident in the country at large,
especially among international businessmen. All felt a sense of
frustration that short of going to war there seemed to be no way
to protect American investment in Cuba or to obtain compensa-
tion. ' Earlier, in writing about Sabbatino, Professor Wolfgang
Friedman had said:
97. Id. at 696.
98. Id. at 706 (app. 1).
99. Id. at 725.
100. Id. at 703.
101. Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on H.R. 11,380 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
102. The Hickenlooper amendments evidenced this frustration. They were passed in
an effort to afford new sanctions that could be used against expropriating nations. Al-
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There is a natural temptation to feel a sense of impotence and
disillusionment about the apparent inability of the law to do
something in redress of a measure that at least the majority
regard as in contravention of accepted rules of international
law.'0 3
It is at least partly in response to these frustrations that the Court
has made various efforts to limit application of the act of state
doctrine over the last decade, particularly by use of the commer-
cial exception sought to be adopted in Dunhill.
The dissent, in rejecting this commercial act exception,
stated that the United States Supreme Court had not yet es-
poused the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, but this
seems too puristic an approach in light of recent developments.
In 1972, the European Convention on State Immunity adopted
the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity."4 Although the
United States was not a party, this trend on the part of tradi-
tional European allies cannot help but influence thinking in this
country. The Department of State has never retreated from its
adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity set forth
in the Tate letter in 1952.05 Recently, Congress passed the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197600 which delineated a re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity. Had the commercial ex-
ception in Dunhill been able to command a majority vote, this
would have added judicial impetus to the development and ac-
ceptance of a new mercantile law.
Of course, such a move toward a "law merchant" is not with-
out its pitfalls. Although the trend would appear to be strongly
in the direction of such development, there is not yet a body of
international law which commands universal acceptance by the
trading nations of the world. According to one commentator:
though the Hickenlooper Amendments are never specifically mentioned in Dunhill, they
form an important part of the background against which the commercial exception was
formulated.
103. Domke, Friedmann, & Henkin, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in
Congress, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99, 103 (1964).
104. European Convention on State Immunity, done May 16, 1972, 3 COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 28 (Europ. T.S. No. 74), 11 Ir'L LEG.
MAT'S 470 (1972). See I.M. Sinclair, The European Convention on State Immunity, 22
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 254-83 (1973).
105. Tate Letter, supra note 82. While the Bernstein Letter specifically suspended
the act of state doctrine in a particular class of cases, the Tate Letter declared the State
Department's adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
106. Pub. L. No. 94-583 (Oct. 21, 1976). See Atkeson, Perkins, & Wyatt,
H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for
Action, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 298 (1976).
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We are beginning to rediscover the international character of
commercial law . . . : the general trend of commercial law
everywhere is to move away from the restrictions of national law
to a universal international conception of the law of interna-
tional trade.' °0
John J. McCloy, however, speaks to the contrary:
One also hears a good bit now about the desirability of adopting
an international code of good commercial behavior. Who is to
draw it, and who is to police it? If the SEC has difficulty draw-
ing up guidelines, I question whether the United Nations is any
better equipped to do so. . . . I can imagine considerable reluc-
tance on the part of a number of countries to subscribe to any
code they felt would restrict them to a course of action to which
they were not accustomed or which they believed could lose
them commercial advantages.' 8
At least partly because of these difficulties Justice White was
unable to induce a majority in Dunhill to declare a commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine. Consequently, the decision
did not formulate a new limitation upon that doctrine. The ex-
pectation that the Court would signal a clear direction in this
disputed area remains unfulfilled in Dunhill.
Louise Hertwig Hayes
107. Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisation of Law by Means of Standard
Contracts and General Conditions, 17 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 551, 563 (1968). A similar idea
is expressed in Rajski, The Law of International Trade of Some European Socialist Coun-
tries and East-West Trade Relations, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 125.
The striking similarity evidenced in all national legal systems in this respect
[international trade] explains itself through the essence of the subject matter
of their regulation: international commerce .... The goal of these provisions
is to safeguard international economic intercourse, which can be achieved by
establishing a stable legal protection of the interests of those involved in foreign
commercial transactions....
Id. at 137.
108. McCloy, On Corporate Payoffs, 54 H~Av. Bus. REv. 14, 20 (July-Aug. 1976).
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